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Despite the growing role of private involvement in recent port developments, most maritime trade is still largely handled in ports where invest-
ments, pricing and other managerial decisions are, to a varying extent, dependent, or at least influenced by public bodies. This paper shows that the
extent and type of public intervention differs considerably between ports in the Hamburg-Le Havre range. The wide variety in ownership, financing
and management of ports throughout Europe indicates that there is no level playing field at present. Because ports operate in an increasingly com-
petitive environment (intensified by globalisation trends and the completion of the internal market), this may lead to situations of unfair competition.
The European Union emphasises the importance of a more harmonised approach of port regulation by national governments (in terms of financing
and pricing of infrastructure). Given the differences in (national) port management styles and the low levels of transparency, the creation of a level
playing field in the European port industry seems far away. This suggests the presence of a major institutional difference in European transport policy
that hampers efficient policy intervention.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Transport has some characteristics that make it dif-
ferent from other goods. Possibly the most important
characteristic of transport is that it is often not really
demanded in its own right1. People wish, in general, to
travel so that some benefit can be obtained at the final
destination. Similarly, users of freight transport perceive
transport as a cost in their overall production function and
seek to minimise it wherever possible. While the demand
for transport has particular, if not unique, features, also
certain aspects of supply are entirely peculiar to transport.
More specifically part of the plant is mobile - almost by
definition and is entirely different in its characteristics to
fixed plant (e.g. roads, airports etc.). The fixed compo-
nent is usually extremely long-lived and expensive to re-
place. Further, few pieces of transport infrastructure have
alternative uses.
These market characteristics make it that govern-
ments are very often involved in the transport market.
This also applies to the port sector where different lev-
els of government are involved in daily operation. We
have witnessed many political initiatives in relation to
ports (e.g. port safety and security), port authorities, port
expansion and pricing by ports and operators within ports.
The ways public bodies are involved is nowadays part of
a political debate due to the distortive consequences in-
tervention may have. Since most European ports operate
in an increasingly competitive market, financing and pric-
ing decisions can have marked effects on other ports, na-
tionally and internationally. The European Commission
shows great interest in the port industry to improve the
market mechanism. It aims for fair competition and a
more harmonised approach among the different countries.
Given the institutional diversity (management, financing)
in the European port sector, it may be evident that the
objectives of the European Commission may not neces-
sarily correspond with national and/or local interests.
This paper analyses differences in policy interven-
tion in the port sector and the consequences this may have
when different organisational institutions (different lev-
els of government) have different objectives. The focus
is on pricing and financing arrangements and the division
of responsibilities between private and public parties
within ports in the highly competitive (and hence rel-
evant) Hamburg-Le Havre range. Conflicting interests
may be a barrier to the efficient implementation of trans-
port policy.
Section 2 provides some general background impor-
tant in the context of port competition and policy inter-
vention. Furthermore, it outlines the European Union
policy in this sector to create more efficient port compe-
tition. Section 3 focuses on the empirical practice con-
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cerning port management, port financing and policy in-
tervention in four ports situated in the Hamburg-Le Havre
range. Section 4 concludes.
2. THE EUROPEAN PORT INDUSTRY:
MARKET, MANAGEMENT AND EU POLICY
A seaport may generally be regarded as a gateway
through which goods and passengers are transferred be-
tween ships and the shore2. Different activities take place
in a port such as approaching and mooring, loading on
docks and transit warehousing. In addition, not necessar-
ily water-related functions can be identified (including
customs and cargo preparation). Therefore, the port prod-
uct may be regarded as a chain of consecutive links, while
the port as a whole may be seen as a link in a global lo-
gistics chain3.
Demand for port services (calls, transhipment and
supplementary) is derived from demand for the goods in-
volved and thus depends on economic growth, industrial
production and international trade. With regard to the
choice of ports of shipping companies, the generalised
cost is an important indicator. This cost is defined as the
sum of out-of-pocket costs (i.e. the price to be paid for
the various services including port dues), time costs, and
the risks of loss, damage and delay4. One should realise,
though, that total port costs account for only a fraction
of the total costs associated with the logistics chain.
The prototypical port does not exist, no two ports
are alike. Ports differ in services offered depending on the
type of cargo. Some focus on dry bulk, others are well-
equipped to serve containers or oil traffic. More impor-
tantly (in the context of this paper), ports differ also in
terms of ownership, organisation and administration lead-
ing to a great diversity in the port sector. Ports have there-
fore inevitably a heterogeneous quality, compared with
the large number of possible market players involved
(such as different levels of government, goods handlers,
unions, shipowners etc.), each of which has specific ob-
jectives4. The respective roles of these actors have
changed profoundly in recent years. Governments and
port authorities have become less influential (but still a
prominent presence), while private parties (especially
goods handlers and shipowners) have gained in impor-
tance. In order to understand the aims and reasons for in-
tervention in the port market by policy makers, it is
essential to know the market situation and the level of
governmental involvement at present.
2.1 Market situation
Ports were in the past fairly insulated from com-
petitive forces, each serving its own, more or less cap-
tive, hinterland5. Trade barriers, national borders and
inadequate hinterland infrastructure were mainly respon-
sible for this situation. However, recent developments
have considerably changed this. Globalisation has led to
a shift in manufacturing activities towards countries with
a comparative advantage. This, together with trade
liberalisation (liberalisation of the internal EU market)
and technological changes (application of information
technology in communication, standardisation of load
units), has had a considerable impact on trade flows and
hence the port industry. But also developments in the
(maritime) transport sector have contributed to a differ-
ent situation. Increased levels of containerisation and
multimodal transport have had a profound impact on port
structures. Moreover, European ports are facing major
external challenges including the grouping of container
shipping lines into powerful consortia (resulting in down-
ward pressure on prices), increased efficiency levels in
maritime transport and the importance of logistical
chains6.
These developments have contributed to a competi-
tive market situation in which port hinterlands have
ceased to be captive and have extended beyond national
boundaries. The mobility of the transhipment container,
together with intertwined land transport networks and
extended hinterlands have intensified competition among
ports immensely5. Today, it makes little difference if a
container from Asia destined for Paris will pass through
the port of Le Havre, Rotterdam, or Antwerp. There is
competition between ports, but even more so between
complete logistics chains4. It is important to ports to be-
long to a successful logistics chain of a particular goods
flow. Ports clearly have incentives to continuously im-
prove efficiency and their products or service. But it is
not only the performance of a port itself that is impor-
tant in a situation of competing transport chains. Port pro-
ductivity also depends on the improvement of the total
transport chain, consequently the competitiveness of a
port and of port planning relate to the relevant charac-
teristics of the other parts of the transport network7. Hin-
terland connections, for instance, have become equally
important.
2.2 Port management in Europe
European ports differ significantly, not only in
terms of ability to handle all or specific types of goods
or the level of technical specification, but also with re-
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gard to their organisation and administration. These lat-
ter more institutional differences depend on the histori-
cal, geographical, and political factors and on the diverse
economic and social environments of ports7.
Ports are often managed by administrative bodies
(port authorities) which generally occupy a relatively in-
dependent position between state and market and whose
administrative structures can vary greatly8. Furthermore,
they maintain relations with central and local government
and with private firms operating within the port area. The
organisational arrangements found in European ports can
be classified in three different types6. Ports in North-west-
ern Europe are characterised by a decentralized munici-
pal port administration, the so-called Hanseatic model.
Countries in southern Europe, such as France, Italy and
Spain, have a state-controlled port administration (the
Latin model). Finally, the British port sector is characterised
by a more independent and privatised organisation (the
Anglo-Saxon model).
In recent years the private sector has become in-
creasingly involved in various activities taking place in
a port. The port industry has moved from one in which
predominantly public funds were used to provide com-
mon user facilities, to one where private and public capi-
tal is being used to provide terminals which are designed
to serve the logistical requirements of a more narrowly
defined group of users. Ports have made considerable
progress towards the development of public-private part-
nerships. This has accelerated since the mid-1980’s in re-
sponse to organisational restructuring and labour reforms,
so that the concept of landlord port, acting as the umbrella
for a host of private concessions is now well established
in most European countries6. Overall, we see the grow-
ing separation between port infrastructure and services,
the delegation of authority to autonomous port manage-
ments, alternative forms of private sector involvement in
ports, and industrial concentration. Despite this growing
role of private involvement in port developments, public
intervention remains large. It is estimated that 90% of
maritime trade in the EU is handled in ports where in-
vestments and other policy and managerial decisions (e.g.
charging) are, to a varying extent, dependent, or at least
influenced by public bodies9. And given the recent atten-
tion and importance of safety and security, it is to be ex-
pected that the role of governments remains large in ports.
2.3 Port policy of the EU
One of the major objectives of EU transport policy
is to increase the efficiency of the transport system by
ensuring the principle of free and fair competition10. The
port industry has always been considered as one where
government intervention was justified and market prin-
ciples played only a minor role. But this situation has
changed. Nowadays the port industry is a highly competi-
tive market where distortion (by governments) should be
avoided according to the EU. Given the existing differ-
ences in organisational frameworks and policy interven-
tion in ports, the issue of financing and pricing of port
infrastructure has recently acquired renewed interest. The
EU acknowledges that financing of ports and maritime
infrastructure in Europe and policies on charging their
users vary considerably between Member States10. It has
identified the lack of transparency of port accounts, trans-
parency being an essential condition for the effective and
fair application of State aid provisions. While accepting
that it should be left to the Member States to decide upon
the ownership and organisation, a key issue for the Com-
mission is the financial flows between public authorities,
the port operator and the users of port facilities and ser-
vices9. The EU raises voices for a more harmonised ap-
proach of port financing and regulation by governments
(the creation of ‘a level playing field’).
The wide variety in ownership, organisation (and
financing) and administration of ports between and within
European countries indicates that there is no level play-
ing field at present in the port sector (see also section 3,
and CEC9). Different ways of financing port investment,
maintenance of port access facilities, social and fiscal
costs relevant to port workers and port facilities are prin-
cipal distortive factors among European seaports. An in-
vestigation of the EU showed that public bodies are often
responsible for substantial financial flows into ports, but
the level of transparency of these flows is unsatisfactory9.
The Commission confirms that the financial flows be-
tween the State (in a broader sense) and commercial un-
dertakings, whether public or private, in the port sector
form a key issue from a competition point of view. How-
ever, state aid remains an issue of the countries, the pow-
ers of the Commission are limited in this. Recent
discussions have focused on the status of investments in
port infrastructure by national governments: should it be
considered as state aid and should the Commission be no-
tified in accordance with article 92? It is then for the
Commission to investigate whether this type of public fi-
nancial support is allowed. Despite the ongoing discus-
sions, Farrell6 concludes that the use of public funds for
developing port infrastructure is not to be considered as
state aid.
The Commission now gives priority to the devel-
opment of a framework on infrastructure charging to
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achieve a level playing field in the port sector rather than
to deal with the differences in financial flows between
governments and ports. This framework would require
port charges to be linked to costs and contain guidelines
on the extent to which port charges should reflect the cost
of infrastructure investments. It aims at creating a level
playing field by identifying basic elements that a port
charging scheme should contain (e.g. description of the
services covered by each charge, calculation methods
etc.). The Commission argues that this would ensure de-
mand-driven investments and fair competition in the port
sector in the long run. However, practical implementa-
tion is far from easy, infrastructure pricing is a contro-
versial and complex issue mainly due to low levels of
transparency and difficulties in determining marginal
costs of a port call. But there seems to be some level of
consensus on the importance of cost recovery in the port
industry11.
3. PORT MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE:
THE HAMBURG-LE HARVE RANGE
The fundamental rationale underlying commercial
ports is that of international trade. The port sector
handles more than 90% of the EU’s trade with third
countries and approximately 30% of intra-EU traffic10.
It shows great diversity between regions in terms of goods
handled (e.g. dry bulk, ro-ro, containers), structure, man-
agement and legal framework. The approximately 2000
ports in Europe vary greatly as to character and institu-
tional structure. In this section the focus is on port man-
agement and the responsibilities of public and private
parties within ports. Port organisation differs consider-
ably within Europe as we have seen in section 2. This
section analyses the institutional organisation of one par-
ticular, but important, (port) region of Europe, namely the
Hamburg-Le Havre range. The word ‘range’ refers to a
geographically defined area encompassing a number of
ports with a largely overlapping hinterland thus serving
much the same customers12. Competition among ports is
large, hence government intervention may have marked
effects. Port management (and public or private respon-
sibilities) of four European ports located within the
Hamburg-Le Havre range will be discussed. We will not
provide a comprehensive overview of all existing ar-
rangements between government and port, the aim is
more to gain insight in the differences in port manage-
ment and financing that are important in the European
policy context of creating a level playing field.
3.1 Empirical case studies: North-western Europe
3.1.1 Rotterdam
The port of Rotterdam, as well as the port of
Amsterdam, is administered by a municipal enterprise
(so-called Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf (GHB)) with their
own budgets, although these have to be approved by the
city councils. This GHB is responsible for nautical man-
agement and the socio-economic development of the
port. It functions as a spider in the web between various
local, regional and national tiers of government and the
national and international port business community. Its
main tasks include the promotion of the public interest
in an accessible, safe and clean port and the recovery
of the costs of port investments8. It is unclear to what
extent investment costs are passed on into port tariffs,
however costs made by the GHB for quays are included.
The city of Rotterdam has always been heavily in-
volved in port management and planning. The GHB was
a municipal department whose chief officer is appointed
by the city council. Each year the GHB handed over a
certain percentage of its revenues (consisting mainly of
seaport dues, leaseholds and land rents) to the city of
Rotterdam.
However, recent developments in the port industry
have initiated a discussion to create a more independent
position of the GHB. As a municipal branch of service,
the GHB considers itself inadequately equipped for its
task in a rapidly changing world such as the port indus-
try. It does not see itself as a provider of infrastructure
and collector of rents. Its aim is to become a promoter
of business activity, maximising Rotterdam’s share of Eu-
ropean economic growth. Its regulatory function has
changed from preserving fair competition between its ten-
ants to creating a business climate which allows them to
compete effectively with companies in other ports6.
Although the national government may not be di-
rectly involved in the management of the port of
Rotterdam, it has an impact on ports by other means.
Historically, the national government in the Netherlands
provides access channels to the port and covers the costs
of maintenance dredging6. It is responsible (in terms of
financing and construction) for the nation’s main trans-
port infrastructure links such as waterways, roads and
railways and hence for the hinterland connections of a
port. A well-known example is the financing and con-
struction of the Betuwe freight railway from Rotterdam
to Emmerich (Germany). It is exactly this kind of state
aid that influences the competitive position of ports. A
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study by the Dutch National Port Commission (Nationale
Havenraad) shows the differences in infrastructure in-
vestments by public or private parties for various North-
western European countries (see Table 1). The port of
Rotterdam finances port infrastructure (e.g. docks)
whereas private companies take care of investments in in-
frastructure to operate terminals (such as cranes, railways
and other equipment). The situation differs between coun-
tries and type of infrastructure. Especially infrastructure
in ports is financed differently in the various countries.
3.1.2 Antwerp
As in the Netherlands, the management of ports is
one of municipal concern in Belgium. The municipality
needs no specific statutory authorisation or order to con-
struct and operate a port. The port administration has
always been considered as a local issue, ports were im-
portant to the local economy and not so much for the na-
tion as a whole. Domestic port competition has always
been found to be highly productive, thus avoiding the
need for a regional or national port policy. The national
Belgian government has only been active in the financ-
ing of infrastructure and leaves almost all public func-
tions in the hands of the municipal government. As a
result of the reforms in the Belgian political system, the
port of Antwerp has come under the Flanders Region
since 19888. Antwerp has a representative in the Flem-
ish Port commission (just as other Flemish ports and rep-
resentatives of employer organisations), which advises the
Flemish government (a provincial public actor) on larger
investment projects and on questions concerning port
management. This commission has only an advisory role,
it has no powers of decision.
The daily operations and tariffs are managed by the
Antwerp port authority (APA) which is a municipal de-
partment under the leadership of the local authority. It
appeals to the Region for a financial or diplomatic con-
tribution to port planning activities. The Flanders Region
has always had a (small) fixed budget for investment in
ports, this resulted in fierce competition for funds between
Antwerp and Zeebrugge. This has made the ports increas-
ingly dependent on their own resources and private fi-
nance. Finally, the Flemish government has special
powers in a number of port administrative matters aimed
at nautical management.
This shows that the involvement of local and re-
gional public governments have been large over years in
the management of the port of Antwerp. However, more
recently (since 1996), also the APA moved towards
greater autonomy. The port of Antwerp became a lim-
ited liability company in 1997, although it is still owned
by the city of Antwerp and most of its board members are
city councillors6. The aim is to make the port more profit
orientated, and allow it to take stakes in private compa-
nies. The APA has become a private monopoly (autono-
mous government company) whose daily activities will
no longer be under direct political control. But owner-
ship and final control still lies with the Antwerp munici-
pal council, so APA may be categorised as a government
monopoly.
Table 1  Financing of infrastructure and maintenance expenses in ports
(G=government (national, regional or local), PA=port authority, PF=private firms)
Netherlands Belgium Germany France UK
Basic infrastructure:
Waterways G G G G (80%)**                   PA
Roads G G G G G
Railways G G G G PF
Port infrastructure:
Port basins PA G* G PA PA
Docks/ moorings PA 20%G PA*** 60% G PA
80%PA 40% PA
Infrastructure plus PF PF PF PF PF
(e.g. cranes, railways to terminals etc)
Superstructure PF PF Mixed PA PF
(infrastructure and equipment in terminals) (both PF and PA)
*
 Flanders region is responsible for port investment in Belgium, maintenance by port authority.
**
 20% is funded by the port authority, maintenance is done by the central government.
***
 There is no separate port authority in Germany, it is the city that regulates ports.
Source: Nationale Havenraad13
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Until 1988 the national government took care of the
costs for major infrastructural works without this being
reflected in the port dues. National changes in the eight-
ies made that the responsibilities for port planning and
port investment were accorded to the Flanders Region. A
more recent policy decision (the so-called Havendecreet
from 1999) resulted in a change in financing responsi-
bilities between government and Belgian port authorities.
It increases the financial responsibilities of port authori-
ties for local port infrastructure (only small national con-
tribution), whereas maritime access (e.g. sea locks and
dredging costs) remains in national hands (see also Table
1). Private involvement is still limited compared with the
situation in Rotterdam. Private actors have control over
their own assets (e.g. cargo handling equipment, line
handling vessels) and superstructures (such as paving,
parking areas etc.), but they are not so much involved
in other infrastructure categories. Private companies in
the port of Antwerp have extensive rights to their prop-
erty, but the scale of property that they are involved in is
limited.
3.1.3 Hamburg
The port of Hamburg has the status of ‘Bundesland’
or city-state which means that the city is responsible for
the port’s administrative and economic policy (just as
other German ports). The port is not managed by an in-
dependent, quasi-autonomous port authority with its own
book keeping as is the case in Rotterdam and Antwerp.
Port management is carried out by the various depart-
ments of the city-state of Hamburg (traffic, economic
affairs etc.). The department of Economic Affairs is re-
sponsible for port development, the construction and
maintenance of infrastructure, environmental regula-
tion and port dues. Infrastructure and land within the
port is in public hands and is maintained by the city of
Hamburg. Land is leased to port businesses for a limited
period of time. The Bundesland invests yearly about 94
million annually in port development14.
Another important institutional player is the Fed-
eral government, which is responsible for the transport
connections to and from the port (road, rail and water).
The Federal government is responsible for the nautical
management and port planning outside the port area. This
means that the federal government covers investment and
maintenance costs for port approach channels and road and
rail access. Although this seems as a strict division of re-
sponsibilities, circumstances are conceivable which would
induce the two authorities to co-operate. This happened
for instance with the deepening of the river Elbe. Access
to the port of Hamburg is limited due to channel depth
constraints. Formally this was the responsibility of the
federal government but due to the local impacts and bud-
get deficits it was the city-state that participated.
An interesting institutional issue in the port of Ham-
burg is the public involvement in cargo handling. Where
in most other ports cargo handling is left to the private
sector, in Hamburg the largest cargo-handling company
(Hamburger Hafen- und Lagerhaus- Aktiengesellschaft)
is 100% owned by the city. The division of responsibili-
ties between the public sector (the city) and the private
sector is regulated by the Port By-law. The actual port
activities, such as storage, processing and distribution of
goods, are the responsibility of the port industry. These
private firms are organised in the Hamburg Port Opera-
tors Association and own and maintain the superstructure
(buildings, cranes and portals). The financial responsibil-
ity for port infrastructure has been assigned to the city.
Infrastructure covers the accessibility of port territories,
waterways and the harbour, including dock walls, roads
and railways up to the boundaries of the leased port ar-
eas. It is obvious that public involvement is extensive,
private actors have no role in any of the infrastructure
above the scale of superstructure or company assets.
3.1.4 Le Havre
The institutional organisation of the most important
French port is different from the ports already discussed
in the sense that the national government is heavily in-
volved. These main ports (among which is Le Havre) are
state owned, but have a two-tier management structure.
These are operated on behalf of the state by autonomous
port authorities. This authority is only responsible to and
is wholly sponsored by the French State. Smaller ports
of national interest are operated under concession, usu-
ally by the local Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In
most cases this means that infrastructure and also su-
perstructure is in public hands (see also Table 1). Su-
perstructure (including rail infrastructure within the port
areas) has traditionally been provided by the port author-
ity and operated on its own account or hired to private
operators.
Financial support from the national government has
been a particularly important factor in the development
of French ports. At the six autonomous ports, which ac-
count for four-fifths of all traffic, the State funds about 80%
of the operating and maintenance costs of maritime access
channels, and about 60% of the costs of docks, locks and
basins14. The port authority funds the remaining part as
well as rail infrastructure within the port area. Either the
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national government or the port authority also covers
most maintenance costs. Port dues are not expected to re-
cover this state contribution to infrastructure costs6.
The port of Le Havre is managed by L’ Autorite
Portuaire du Havre, a public organisation supervised by
a board of directors. This organisation owns land and in-
frastructure, as well as most superstructure. The transfer
of goods is done by private parties, this explains why
some specific handling infrastructure (cranes) and equip-
ment are in private hands. This makes that there is very
little private involvement in port functions in the port of
Le Havre. This is partly caused by the function of the
port: it is regarded as a transition point for French inter-
nal businesses. There was no need for any other services,
such as warehousing, provided by market investors.
More recently, attempts have been made to make
the French ports more competitive and include the pri-
vate sector in the development. In 1996 the National
Council of Port Communities took the lead in suggest-
ing a more radical programme of port reforms (see
Farrell6). It called among others for freedom to determine
the organisational structure of each port (to allow for in-
stance for public private partnerships) and port authori-
ties were allowed to take shares in private companies
engaged in port-related activities. However, the proposal
on the commercialisation of port management met strong
opposition from the unions, and it was eventually dropped
in favour of more modest reforms.
3.2 Comparison and overview
In the market situation of competing logistic chains,
government involvement may have considerable conse-
quences for the competitive position of major ports and
hinder the market to operate more efficiently. It is exactly
for this reason that the EU aims for more harmonisation
in government support in order to create a level playing
field. The previous description of the case studies revealed
considerable differences in ownership and financing
structures in the Hamburg-Le Havre range, this suggests
that a level playing field is not the case at present. Na-
tional and local governments are most often involved for
various reasons of which safety, environmental, and eco-
nomic grounds (employment) are most important.
Table 2 shows the differences in institutional
organisation of port management and port financing in
the Hamburg-Le Havre range. Port management is clearly
a (local) governmental task, despite increasing private in-
volvement. Investments in infrastructure are done by vari-
ous institutions. Access to ports is the responsibility of
national governments, whereas port authorities, local gov-
ernments, or private organisations may pay more local
infrastructure.
Hence, the national government is very often re-
sponsible for investments in port infrastructure, especially
when it comes to (maritime) access infrastructure. The
Dutch government for instance, financed the new Betuwe
freight railway from Rotterdam to the German hinterland.
This type of financial support is important because it may
have a considerable impact on inter port competition. The
division of responsibilities between port authority and
national government on the one hand and public versus
private investors on the other hand is more mixed con-
cerning superstructure. But still, governmental support
remains considerable.
Given these differences in the organisation of own-
ership and financing of port infrastructure, it may be ex-
pected that the amount of financial support from the
various public bodies is different between countries. Re-
search towards the amount of subsidies from public gov-
ernments has not provided a clear insight in the financial
flows. An inventory of the EU concluded that the cur-
rent levels of transparency in the port sector are inad-
equate to ensure information on aggregated public money
flow going into the ports9. It is difficult to compare the
financial performance of different ports. Many European
ports do not publish their accounts, while others record
Table 2  Overview of institutional responsibilities for several activities in ports in Hamburg-Le Havre range
Activity Rotterdam Antwerp Hamburg Le Havre
Port management Port authority Port authority Local Port authority
under local under local governmental under national
governmental governmental control public control
control control
Access infrastructure National gov. National gov. National gov. National gov.
Port Infrastructure Port authority Port authority City National gov./port auth.
Superstructure Private Private Port authority and private Port authority
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certain transactions outside their formal accounting sys-
tems. There are also many different financial relationships
with governments and concessionaires. State aid to ports
comes into various forms (e.g. tax exemptions, preferen-
tial land tariffs) of which some may be difficult to as-
sess. But it is obvious that financial support has been and
still is considerable. Haralambides5 argues for instance
that massive amounts of public monies have been
funnelled into port development, enabling many ports to
consolidate their market position.
Finally, port pricing is an important issue in this
context. The way ports are financed and its ownership sta-
tus are important to the pricing strategy of a port. Heavily
subsidised ports are able to charge lower port dues than
competing, privatised ports that try to recover its invest-
ments. As a consequence mutual accusations of unfair
competition are rife, often resulting in interventions of the
regulatory authorities4. This situation has led the EU to
consider current pricing practices and the possibilities to
achieve more efficient, cost based pricing. Relatively little
empirical research has been conducted on actual pricing
strategies by and within ports. A recent study (ATENCO)
indicates that there are substantial differences between the
respective funding and pricing practices applied in ports
across Europe (results of ATENCO are presented in
Haralambides5).  This diversity is deeply rooted in dif-
ferent legal and cultural traditions, together with the dif-
ferences in terms of port management style and the
related issues of competencies and degree of autonomy.
The level of subsidies is only a small factor when it comes
to setting prices. The issue of infrastructure pricing in
ports remains highly complex, and uniform pricing seems
meaningless and politically unfeasible.
Current European policy focuses on cost recovery
(see section 2.2). It is difficult to estimate the extent to
which infrastructure costs are being recovered from port
users. Published port charges are rarely based on explicit
accounting principles, and are substantially modified by
rebates and negotiated service contracts for large custom-
ers6. But results from the ATENCO survey among port
authorities suggest that the majority supported the adop-
tion of ‘user pays’ principles in ports. Surprisingly, most
ports expect that this would have little impact on current
pricing levels. It was acknowledged by the port manage-
ment teams interviewed that implementation of cost re-
covery requires better port statistics, accounting systems
and transparency of port accounts. Moreover, they were
generally aware of the distortive effect that public sup-
port schemes in European ports may have.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Globalisation and the changing operational environ-
ment of ports as well as the completion of the internal
market have brought about increased competition be-
tween ports. The choice for a port is not so straightfor-
ward anymore, its proximity to a certain destination is of
lesser importance nowadays. Port dues, quality of the of-
fered services (e.g. in terms of safety) and the quality of
hinterland connections have become even more impor-
tant. In such a competitive setting it is obvious that fi-
nancing and pricing decisions may have marked effects
on its neighbours, nationally and internationally. This
has led the European commission to aim for a more
harmonised approach concerning port financing and pric-
ing in order to support a level playing field and create a
more efficient market.
This is a complex and formidable task. The empiri-
cal overview of port management shows the considerable
differences in ownership and financing structures between
competing ports. National and local governments are usu-
ally involved in port operation. Given these differences,
it may be expected that also the amount of financial sup-
port from the various governments may differ among
ports. However, an accurate estimation of the aggregated
public money flows is not possible due to unsatisfactory
levels of transparency. The fact is that massive amounts
of money have been funnelled into ports, enabling many
of them to consolidate their market position. Obviously,
the objectives of national governments are in conflict with
that of the EU. The EU aims for fair competition on the
European market, whereas national and local govern-
ments are only interested in the economic functioning of
its own ports without considering the international con-
sequences of intervention. It is difficult for the EU to in-
tervene since ports are considered in most countries as
part of the country’s infrastructure and thus State invest-
ment in ports is considered as public investment outside
the mandate of the Commission. The attention now
moves to port pricing. Prices should be based on actual
costs in order to create a level playing field. This also in-
cludes complexities such as differences in accounting sys-
tems and the limited transparency of port accounts,
making cost recovery a difficult objective. Hence, the EU
objective of a level playing field does not coincide with
national interests resulting in conflicting policy objectives
making harmonisation of pricing and financing within the
port sector rather unfeasible. The situation in the port in-
dustry shows that differences between two levels of gov-
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ernment can form an important institutional barrier that
prevents efficient implementation of a transport policy.
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